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Abstract— Key management is a core mechanism to ensure
the security of applications and network services in wireless
sensor networks. It includes two aspects: key distribution and
key revocation. Key distribution has been extensively studied
in the context of sensor networks. However, key revocation
has received relatively little attention. Existing key revocation
schemes can be divided into two categories: centralized key
revocation scheme and distributed key revocation scheme. In this
paper, we first summarize the current key revocation schemes for
sensor networks. Then, we propose an efficient centralized key
revocation scheme, KeyRev, for wireless sensor networks. Unlike
most proposed key revocation schemes focusing on removing the
compromised keys, we propose to use key updating techniques
to obsolesce the keys owned by the compromised sensor nodes
and thus remove the nodes from the network. Our analyses
show that the KeyRev scheme is secure inspite of not removing
the pre-distributed key materials at compromised sensor nodes.
Simulation results also indicate that the KeyRev scheme is
scalable and performs very well in wireless sensor networks.

I. I NTRODUCTION
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are promising solutions
for many applications and security is an essential requirement
of WSNs [1]. Among all security issues in WSNs, key
management is a core mechanism to ensure the security of
applications and network services in WSNs.
The goal of key management is to establish the required
keys between sensor nodes which exchange data. A key management scheme includes two aspects: key distribution and key
revocation. Key distribution refers to the task of distributing
secret keys to sensor nodes to provide communication secrecy
and authenticity. Key revocation refers to the task of securely
removing keys which are known to be compromised. Key
distribution has been exclusively studied under the constraints
on computation and power consumption in sensor networks
[2], [3], [4]. However, key revocation has received relatively
little attention.
Because sensor nodes in WSNs may be deployed in hostile
or insecure environments, the security of sensor nodes must be
considered. In case a sensor node is captured or compromised,
the sensor node must be removed securely from the network.
The problem of sensor node removal is usually reduced to
that of key revocation [4], [5]. By revoking all of the keys
belonging to a known compromised sensor node, the node
can be removed from the network.
Most of the proposed key management schemes depend on
some key materials being pre-distributed in the sensor nodes.

These pre-distributed key materials might include an initial
key shared by all sensor nodes [2], a pairwise key shared
between the base station and the sensor node [3], or a key ring
consisting of certain number of keys to be used in the future
[4], [3]. The keys for secure communication, for example,
pairwise keys [3], path keys [3], cluster keys [2] used by sensor
nodes are set up based on those pre-distributed materials in
the bootstrap stage. When a sensor node is compromised, the
keys set up on the fly and the pre-distributed materials must
be revoked.
Revocation attack is a specific attack in which an adversary
uses the node revocation protocol to selectively revoke uncompromised sensors from the network. Revocation attack must
be considered in designing a revocation scheme. Moreover,
compromised nodes may act as an adversary’s surrogates
within a revocation protocol and subvert the execution of the
revocation protocol [5]. Thus, the resistance to compromised
sensors should also be evaluated in a revocation protocol.
Finally, after compromised sensors are removed from the
network, new sensors might be re-deployed to replace those
compromised sensors. The node addition problem must also
be considered.
A few schemes [3], [4], [5] have been proposed to address
the key revocation problem in WSNs. However, these schemes
incur various difficulties when used in sensor networks. For
example, the centralized key revocation scheme proposed in
[3] requires a signature key distributed in the sensor nodes.
However, the signature key can only be distributed by unicasting which causes severe performance issues in large scale
sensor networks. The distributed key revocation schemes proposed in [4], [5] are based on some strong assumptions such
as each node knowing its neighboring nodes and each node
knowing its neighboring node’s neighbors before deployment.
These assumptions are hard to satisfy. Thus, designing a new
efficient key revocation scheme is highly desirable.
In this paper, we propose a key revocation scheme, KeyRev,
for wireless sensor networks. Unlike most proposed key revocation schemes focusing on removing the compromised keys,
we propose to use key updating techniques to obsolesce the
keys owned by the compromised sensor nodes and thus remove
the nodes from the network. Our analysis and simulation
results show that our proposed key revocation scheme is secure and efficient in computation, communication and storage
usage.
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section
II discusses the related work. Section III presents our proposed
key revocation scheme. The security and performance analyses
are presented in Section IV, and the simulation experiments
and results in Section V. Section VI concludes the paper.
II. R ELATED WORK
As discussed before, key revocation refers to the task of
securely removing keys which are known to be compromised.
To detect a compromised sensor, intrusion detection techniques
are employed. Intrusion detection is out of the scope of this
paper. We assume that there are some methods [6], [7], [8] for
a base station to detect a compromised sensor node. Another
issue which must be considered is reconfiguration. The topology of the WSN needs to be rebuilt after the compromised
sensors are removed. Sensors might be re-deployed to replace
those compromised sensors. The rest of the section reviews
several known key revocation schemes in WSNs.
Existing key revocation schemes can be divided into two
categories: centralized key revocation scheme [3] and distributed key revocation scheme [4], [5]. We discuss these in turn
below.
A. Centralized key revocation scheme
In centralized key revocation scheme, a centralized authority
(base station) is used to revoke compromised sensors [3].
Eschenauer and Gligor presented a key management scheme
for WSNs in [3]. This scheme, which is called the basic random key scheme in this paper, is a centralized key revocation
scheme. Before describing the key revocation scheme, we first
introduce the key distribution scheme which will be used later
to demonstrate how to revoke the compromised key materials
in our scheme.
The key distribution scheme consists of three phases: key
pre-distribution, shared-key discovery, and path key establishment.
In the key pre-distribution phase, each sensor is equipped
with a key ring held in the memory. The key ring consists
of k keys which are randomly drawn from a large pool of
P keys. The association information of the key identifiers in
the key ring and sensor identifier are also stored at the base
station. Further, the authors assumed that each sensor i shares
a pairwise key K ci with the base station.
In the shared key discovery phase, each sensor discovers its
neighbors within wireless communication range with which it
shares keys. Two methods to accomplish this are suggested
in [3]. The simplest method is for each node to broadcast
a list of identifiers of the keys in its key ring in plain text
allowing neighboring nodes to check whether they share a
key. However, an adversary may observe the key-sharing
patterns among sensors in this way. The second method uses
the challenge-response technique to hide key-sharing patterns
among nodes from an adversary. For every key Ki on a key
ring, each node could broadcast a list α, EKi (α), i = 1, ..., k
where α is a challenge. The decryption of EKi (α) with the

proper key by a recipient would reveal the challenge and
establish a shared key with the broadcasting node.
Finally, in the path-key establishment phase, a path-key
is assigned between sensor nodes which are within wireless
communication range but do not share a key at the end of the
second phase.
If a node is compromised, the base station can send a
message to all other sensors to revoke the compromised node’s
key ring. The revocation scheme in [3] can be divided into
three phases: signature key distribution, key revocation and
link reconfiguration.
In the signature key distribution phase, the base station
generates a signature key Ke and unicasts it to each node
by encrypting it with a pairwise key K ci shared by the base
station with the i-th sensor node.
In the key revocation phase, the base station broadcasts a
single message containing a list of key identifiers for the key
ring to be revoked signed by the signature key. Each sensor
verifiers the signature of the key revocation message, locates
those identifiers in its key ring, and removes the corresponding
keys.
Once the keys are removed from the key rings, some links
may disappear, and the affected nodes need to reconfigure
those links by restarting the shared-key discovery, and possibly
the path-key establishment, phases.
The key revocation scheme in [3] requires n unicast messages and one broadcast message. In a large scale sensor
network, distributing the signature key might be a problem.
Pre-distributing the signature key might be possible; however,
once the signature key is compromised, the adversary could
use the signature key to duplicate the revocation messages
from the base station.
B. Distributed key revocation scheme
In a distributed key revocation scheme, no centralized authority is used. Chan et al. proposed a distributed key revocation scheme for sensor networks in [4] and further investigated
this scheme in [5]. In this distributed key revocation scheme,
a vote is cast and collected among sensor nodes. If the vote
tally against a sensor node exceeds a specified threshold, the
sensor node will be revoked. Chan’s scheme depends on the
secret sharing scheme proposed in [9].
Note that Chan’s scheme is built on some simplifying
assumptions; for example, each node knows its neighboring
nodes and each node knows its neighboring node’s neighboring nodes before deployment. It is hard to satisfy these
requirements.
Compared with the centralized key revocation scheme, the
distributed key revocation scheme is faster because it requires
local broadcast and avoids a single point of failure. However,
the distributed key revocation scheme is more complex than
the centralized key revocation scheme. Further, it is also possible to compromise enough nodes to sabotage the distributed
key revocation scheme. For more detailed information about
the distributed key revocation scheme, please refer to [4], [5].
This paper focuses on a centralized key revocation scheme.
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In the remainder of this paper, we present an efficient key
revocation scheme, KeyRev, for wireless sensor networks. We
use the following notation in the remainder of this paper:
• A, B are principals such as communicating nodes.
• KAB denotes the secret pairwise key shared between A
and B.
• MK is the encryption of message M with key K.
• M AC(K, M ) denotes the computation of the message
authentication code of message M with key K.
• M1 |M2 denotes the concatenation of messages M1 and
M2 .
• A −→ B denotes that A unicasts a message to B.
III. K EY R EV: AN EFFICIENT KEY REVOCATION SCHEME
FOR WSN S
Unlike most of the proposed key revocation schemes focusing on removing the compromised keys, our scheme, KeyRev,
uses key updating techniques to obsolesce the keys owned
by the compromised sensor nodes and thus remove the nodes
from the network. The KeyRev scheme does not depend on a
specified key distribution scheme. Without loss of generality,
we assume that the basic random key distribution scheme [3]
is used. Here, we provide an overview of our scheme.
The basic random key distribution scheme establishes two
kinds of keys among sensor nodes: the pairwise keys and
the path keys. When a sensor node is compromised, the
compromised keys must be revoked so that the compromised
keys will not be chosen again as the new secret keys. Instead
of using the pairwise keys and the path keys directly for the
communication secrecy and authenticity, we propose two kinds
of keys for secure communication in the sensor network: the
encryption key and the message authentication code (MAC)
key. The encryption key and the MAC key are generated by a
pseudo-random function which is bound to the pairwise key or
the path key, and a session key distributed regularly by the base
station to all the sensor nodes in the network. When the session
key is updated, the encryption key and the MAC key are also
changed. A sensor node always uses the latest encryption key
and MAC key to encrypt and sign the outgoing messages or
decrypt and verify the incoming messages. If there is a session
key distribution scheme in which the revoked sensors cannot
recover the new session key when they are revoked, these
revoked sensors will be removed from the network because
they cannot derive the new encryption keys and the MAC
keys in the next session. Although an adversary may retain
the pairwise keys and the path keys, the adversary cannot
figure out the encryption keys and the MAC keys because
of the pseudo-random function used. Thus, the key revocation
problem is reduced to the session key update problem.
In the remainder of this section, we first present the KeyRev
scheme assuming an effective session key distribution scheme
is used, and then we introduce the session key distribution
scheme.
A. KeyRev scheme
The lifetime of a WSN is partitioned into time intervals
called sessions. The duration of sessions can be fixed or

dynamic depending on the applications. The base station is responsible for distributing session keys to the sensor nodes. We
use Kj to denote the j-th session key where j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , m}
and m is the number of sessions.
We assume that each sensor is uniquely identified by an
ID number i, where i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and n is the largest ID
number. Each sensor maintains a list: node revocation list
(NRL). A node revocation list includes all the sensor identifiers
which have been revoked in the network. The revocation list
is empty initially and will be populated as the time goes by.
The revocation list is checked for any incoming and outgoing
messages to ensure that only valid sensors are members of the
network. We also assume that the pairwise keys and the path
keys have been set up by the basic random key distribution
scheme.
We propose two kinds of keys for secure communication
in the sensor network: the encryption key Kencr and the message authentication code (MAC) key Kmac . For any message
transmitted in the network, encryption and authentication are
required. Let A and B be two entities in a WSN, the complete
message A sends to B is:
A −→ B : {M |Ts }Kencr , M AC(Kmac , {M |Ts }Kencr )
where M is the message, Ts is the timestamp when sending
the message, and M AC(K, R) denotes the computation of the
message authentication code of message R with key K.
Let Kj be the current session key and KAB represent the
pairwise key or path key shared between the sensor nodes A
and B. The encryption key and the MAC key used in session
j can be generated as follows:
Kencr = F (M AC(KAB , Kj ), 1)
Kmac = F (M AC(KAB , Kj ), 2)

(1)
(2)

where F (K, x) is a pseudo-random function and x is an
integer 1 or 2 for generating Kencr or Kmac respectively.
The security of the communication between A and B is
ensured by the encryption key Kencr and the MAC key Kmac .
Both of them are bound to the session key and will be updated
when the session key is updated. Any message that A sends to
B is encrypted by the encryption key Kencr and signed by the
MAC key Kmac . For any message that B receives from A, B
always verifies the message first and then decrypts it. Further,
a sensor node always uses the encryption key and the MAC
key corresponding to the current session key to encrypt and
sign the outgoing messages or decrypt and verify the incoming
messages.
If there is a method to stop the compromised sensors from
obtaining the new session keys and thus stop them from
deriving Kencr and Kmac , then the compromised sensors can
no longer decrypt new messages and authenticate themselves.
For example, if A is compromised and A cannot recover the
new session key, then A cannot derive the new encryption
key and the MAC key while B can. Due to the lack of the
proper keys to encrypt and sign the messages, A cannot send
any valid messages to B from that time. Therefore, the sensor
node A is removed from the network.
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Next, we introduce the session key distribution scheme used
in KeyRev.
B. Session key distribution scheme
To make the KeyRev scheme work, the session key distribution scheme must satisfy the following criteria:
1) The compromised sensors should not be able to obtain
the new session keys.
2) The sensor network is time synchronized so that the
current keys can be identified.
Criterion 2 is easily satisfied. For criterion 1, we derive a
simple session key distribution scheme based on the personal
key share distribution scheme in [10]. The session key distribution scheme can be divided into three phases, viz., setup,
broadcast, and session key recovery.
1) Setup: The setup server randomly picks m 2t-degree
masking polynomial, hj (x) = hj,0 + hj,1 x + · · · +
hj,2t x2t , j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , m}, over a finite field Fq where
q is a sufficiently large prime number. For each sensor
node Ai , the setup server loads the personal secrets,
{h1 (i), h2 (i), · · · , hm (i)}, to the node A. The setup
server also loads the polynomial, hj (x), to the base
station. For each session key Kj , the setup server randomly picks a t-degree polynomial pj (x) and constructs
qj (x) = Kj − pj (x).
2) Broadcast: Given a set of revoked group members, R =
{r1 , r2 , · · · , rw }, w ≤ t in session j, the base station
distributes the shares of t-degree polynomial pj (x) and
qj (x) to non-revoked sensors via the following broadcast
message:
B

= {R}
∪ {Pj (x) = gj (x)pj (x) + hj (x)}
∪

h6 (x) = 1 + x8 for session 6 and each sensor receives a secret
h6 (1) = 2, h6 (2) = 257, and h6 (3) = 6562 respectively. Let
K6 = 101, p6 (x) = 1+x4 and thus we have q6 (x) = 100−x4
and g6 (x) = x − 2. In session 6, the base station broadcasts a
message:
B

= {2}
∪ {P6 (x) = (x − 2)(1 + x4 ) + 1 + x8 }
∪

{Q6 (x) = (x − 2)(100 − x4 ) + 1 + x8 }

When sensor 1 receives the message, sensor 1 calculates:
P6 (1) = 0, Q6 (1) = −97 and thus p6 (1) = 2 and q6 (1) = 99.
Sensor 1 computes the session key K6 = p6 (1)+q6 (1) = 101;
Similarly, sensor 3 calculates: P6 (3) = 6644, Q6 (3) = 6581
and thus p6 (3) = 82 and q6 (3) = 19. Sensor 3 can also
compute the session key K6 = p6 (3)+q6 (3) = 101. However,
sensor 2 cannot calculate p6 (2) and q6 (2) because g6 (2) = 0
and thus sensor 2 cannot derive the new session key.
A missing link in the above scheme is how a base station
broadcasts authenticated messages. In the absence of authentication of broadcast messages, an adversary can impersonate
a base station and start a revocation attack. µT ESLA [11]
and its extensions [12], [13] have been proposed to provide
such services for sensor networks. We assume that a proper
broadcast authentication scheme such as µT ESLA is used
in the paper. Note that to use µT ESLA, the sensor network
should be loosely time synchronized to meet the requirements
[14].
IV. S ECURITY AND PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section we first discuss the security of the protocol.
Then, we analyze the computation and communication costs
and storage requirements of the KeyRev protocol.
A. Security analysis

{Qj (x) = gj (x)qj (x) + hj (x)}

where the revocation polynomial gj (x) is constructed as
gj (x) = (x − r1 )(x − r2 ) · · · (x − rw ).
3) Session key recovery: If any non-revoked sensor node
Ai receives such a broadcast message, it evaluates the
polynomial Pj (x) and Qj (x) at point i and gets Pj (i) =
gj (i)pj (i) + hj (i) and Qj (i) = gj (i)qj (i) + hj (i).
Because Ai knows hj (i) and gj (i) = 0, it can compute
P (i)−h (i)
Q (i)−h (i)
pj (i) = j gj (i)j and qj (i) = j gj (i)j . Ai finally
can compute the new session key Kj = pj (i) + qj (i).
The revoked sensors cannot recover pj (i) and qj (i) because
gj (i) = 0 and thus cannot recover the new session key. Without obtaining the new session key, the revoked sensors cannot
derive the encryption key Kencr and the MAC key Kmac and
thus cannot decrypt new messages and authenticate themselves
to other sensor nodes in the network. The compromised sensor
nodes can thus be removed.
To demonstrate the session key distribution process, an
example is given below. We consider three sensors with ID
numbers 1, 2, and 3 respectively. We assume sensor 2 is
compromised in session 5 and will be revoked in session 6. In
the setup phase, the setup server picks the masking polynomial

Our proposed key revocation scheme, KeyRev, satisfies the
following properties:
Property 1 The session key distribution process is secure.
The session key is distributed using the personal key distribution scheme [10]. To restore the session key, it requires
some personal secret to be pre-distributed among the sensor
nodes. Outsiders cannot recover the session key without the
pre-distributed secret. Further, as we show in Section III-B, the
revoked sensors cannot recover the new session keys either.
Thus, the session key distribution process is secure.
Property 2 The KeyRev scheme is secure inspite of the nonremoval of the pre-distributed key materials at a compromised
sensor node.
Although, due to the non-removal of the pre-distributed key
materials, the compromised sensor may retain the pairwise
keys, the adversaries cannot figure out the encryption key
Kencr and the MAC key Kmac if the session key is updated.
In the worst case, an adversary might use a chosen plaintext
attack to crack the session key; however, the attack itself is
also time consuming. As long as the duration of sessions is
less than the session key cracking time, the proposed key
revocation scheme is secure.
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Property 3 The KeyRev scheme is immune to revocation
attack assuming the base station is secure.
The KeyRev scheme depends on the base station to distribute and update the session key. Broadcast authentication
schemes such as µT ESLA [15] can be used to protect
the broadcast messages. To start the revocation attack, an
adversary must impersonate the base station. The KeyRev
scheme is immune to revocation attack if the base station is
secure.

We consider both the KeyRev scheme and the EsRev
scheme operating on a finite field Fq , where q is a 56-bit
integer. The polynomial degree t in the KeyRev scheme is set
to t = 4. We use the simulator parameters that represent the
Mica2 Mote radio characteristics. These parameters are shown
in Table I. For each testbed, we randomly select one sensor
to be revoked and run the simulation ten times. The average
value is measured.
TABLE I
C HARACTERISTIC DATA FOR THE M ICA 2 SENSOR PLATFORM .

B. Performance analysis
To restore the session key, each sensor node must evaluate
the polynomial Pj (x) and Qj (x) at point i. The polynomial
evaluation is fast and thus the session key recovery is efficient.
The performance of the KeyRev scheme depends mainly
on the session key updating process. The session key can
be updated in one round by broadcasting a message to all
sensor nodes. Nevertheless, the centralized revocation scheme
proposed in [3] depends on a signature key distributed in the
sensor network by unicasting and thus incurs additional intersensor communication cost. Our proposed KeyRev scheme is
scalable to large scale sensor networks.
To add new nodes to the sensor network, pre-distributed key
materials required by the basic random key distribution scheme
must be loaded on to the sensor nodes. In addition, the setup
server must also load the personal secrets, {hj (i)}j=1..m ,
required by the session key updating process, to each added
sensor node.
Overall, the KeyRev scheme is efficient in consideration of
the computation load, communication cost, and storage space.
V. S IMULATION AND RESULTS
The performance of the KeyRev scheme was evaluated in
SENSIM [16], a component-based discrete-event simulator for
sensor networks. Each sensor node in SENSIM consists of
six components, i.e., app, net, mac, phy, event generator, and
battery. In the physical component, the free space propagation
model is used. In the mac component, all the packets sent
to MAC layer are guaranteed to be received at the receivers.
Thus, no packet collisions are considered and the performance
evaluated in the simulation is under ideal conditions.
We consider two sensor network experimental settings: a
small-scale sensor network with 100 nodes uniformly dispersed in a field with dimension 100m × 100m and a largescale sensor network with 1000 nodes uniformly dispersed in
a field with dimension 2000m × 2000m. In both networks, we
set the base station at the center of field and we assume that
all the sensor nodes are within reach of the base station.
We compare the KeyRev scheme with the centralized key revocation scheme in [3] (which is referred as EsRev scheme in
the remainder of this section). The evaluation metrics include
the key revocation time and the average energy consumption
per node to revoke a compromised sensor in the network. The
key revocation time is the time duration from when the key
revocation protocol starts until all the uncompromised sensor
nodes receive the key revocation message.

Field
Effective data rate
Transmit power
Receive power
Idle power
Sleep
Transition power
Transition time

Value
19.2kbps
36mW
14.4mW
14.4mW
0.015mW
28.8mW
800µs

Figures 1 and 2 show the key revocation time and the
average energy consumption to revoke a compromised sensor
in the 100-node sensor network. As the figures show, the key
revocation time and the average energy consumption to revoke
a single sensor by using the EsRev scheme is about 83 and
73 times that of the KeyRev scheme.
Figures 3 and 4 show the key revocation time and the
average energy consumption to revoke a compromised sensor
in the 1000-node sensor network. As the figures show, the
key revocation time and the average energy consumption to
revoke a single sensor by using the EsRev scheme are about
805 times that of the KeyRev scheme.
In both the experimental settings, the KeyRev scheme
performs far better than the EsRev scheme. Further, unlike the
EsRev scheme, the figures also show that the key revocation
time and the average energy consumption to revoke a single
sensor node by using the KeyRev scheme have only a slight
difference between the 100-node sensor network and the 1000node sensor network, which indicates that the KeyRev scheme
is scalable to large-scale sensor networks. However, as figure 3
shows, it takes a long time (> 8mins) for the EsRev scheme
to remove a compromised sensor node in the 1000-node sensor
network. Thus, the EsRev scheme is not scalable to large-scale
sensor networks.
VI. C ONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we proposed a key revocation scheme,
KeyRev, for wireless sensor networks. Unlike most of the key
revocation schemes proposed in the literature such as [3], [4],
[5] focusing on removing the compromised keys, our proposed
scheme focuses on updating the session key and thus avoids
the communication overhead to distribute the signature key to
each sensor in the network.
As the simulation results show, the performance of the
KeyRev scheme is far better than that of the EsRev scheme
and the KeyRev scheme is also scalable to large-scale sensor
networks.
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Fig. 1. Key revocation time in the 100-node sensor network. The EsRev key
revocation time is 83 times that of the KeyRev scheme.

Fig. 2. Average energy consumption per node to revoke a compromised
sensor in the 100-node sensor network. The average energy consumption to
execute the EsRev protocol per node is 73 times that of the KeyRev scheme.

The KeyRev scheme depends on an effective session key
distribution scheme in the network, which is currently based
on the personal key share distribution scheme proposed in
[10]. Further investigation on different session key distribution
schemes will be conducted in the future.
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